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One Strike and You're Out: "Double-
Counting" and Dual Use Undermines
the Purpose of California's Three
Strikes Law
By SHANNON THORNE*
THE CALIFORNIA PENAL Code contains two nearly identical statu-
tory schemes popularly known as "Three Strikes."' Together they
provide increased sentencing for repeat criminal offenders. 2 The Cali-
fornia legislature and voters passed Three Strikes "to ensure longer
prison sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a fel-
ony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony
offenses."3 Under Three Strikes, all prior serious or violent felony con-
victions, as defined by California law, count as "strikes."4 This Com-
ment will examine how the "Three Strikes" law has become a
misnomer in practice by frequently punishing two-time offenders as
three-time offenders ("double-counting"), and allowing prior felony
convictions to be used twice-once to increase a misdemeanor to a
felony and once as a strike ("dual use").
Part I of this Comment details Three Strikes' statutory provisions.
It also discusses two recent California Supreme Court cases, People v.
* Class of 2000. The author thanks Professor Steven Shatz for his assistance and
valuable comments. Thanks also to my husband, Robert Gavin, for his love and support.
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp.
1999). For purposes of this Comment, all references to "Three Strikes" will be to Penal
Code section 667. Sections 667 and 1170.12 are virtually identical. See Erik G. Luna, Fore-
word: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REv. 1, 9 n.68 (1998).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12.
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (1); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West 1999)
(defining "violent felony"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West Supp. 1999) (defining "se-
rious felony").
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Fuhrman5 and People v. Benson,6 to illustrate the real-life consequences
of double-counting and dual use in the Three Strikes context.
Part II defines double-counting. It begins with a summary of Cali-
fornia's law against multiple punishment and the process of staying
felony convictions to avoid multiple punishment. Part II also discusses
the California Supreme Court's decision in Benson, wherein the court
disregarded precedent by allowing Benson's three-strikes life sentence
to stand, despite the fact he was only a two-time offender. Part II then
addresses the California Supreme Court's decision in Fuhrman. There
the court allowed a defendant convicted of two serious or violent felo-
nies during a single judicial proceeding to receive two strikes from
that proceeding.7 Part II then criticizes the California Supreme
Court's reasoning in the Benson and Fuhrman decisions and advocates
a "brought and tried separately" requirement. 8 This requirement
would prohibit counting multiple strikes in a single judicial
proceeding.
Part III defines dual use 9 and suggests the California Supreme
Court apply the rule it promulgated in People v. Edwards.10 Edwards
prohibited the dual use of a prior felony conviction as an element of a
charged offense and as a means to increase a. criminal defendant's
sentence."
Part IV analyzes the purpose of recidivist statutes and concludes
that double-counting and dual use frustrate that purpose, often lead-
ing to arbitrary results.
5. 941 P.2d 1189 (Cal. 1997).
6. 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998).
7. See Fuhrman, 941 P.2d at 1190, 1195.
8. See id. at 1190 (holding that prior felony convictions need not be brought and
tried separately to count as separate strikes).
9. Dual use occurs in several instances: (1) using the same prior felony conviction as
a "strike" and as a five-year enhancement under California Penal Code section 667(a); (2)
using the same prior felony conviction as a "strike" and as a "sentence enhancing statute;"
and (3) using the same prior felony conviction as a strike and as an element of a crime. See
AL MENASTER & ALEX RICCIARDULLI, 3 STRiKEs MANuAL 91 (1997). The focus of this Com-
ment is with the third aspect of dual use-using the same prior felony conviction as a strike
and as an element of the crime.
10. 557 P.2d 995 (Cal. 1976).
11. See id. at 999.
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I. Background
A. The Statutory Provisions of Three Strikes
California has enacted two similar versions of the Three Strikes
law. In March 1994, the California Legislature passed the Three
Strikes legislation as Assembly Bill 971.12 In November 1994, the vot-
ers overwhelmingly passed Proposition 184, the Three Strikes initia-
tive. 13 California Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b) through
(i),14 codified Assembly Bill 971. California Penal Code section
1170.1215 codified Proposition 184. The initiative measure cemented
Three Strikes' longevity-a two-thirds vote by the legislature is re-
quired to modify or repeal a voter initiative, while a majority vote can
alter a legislative amendment. 16
Subdivision (b) of section 667 sets forth the legislative intent be-
hind Three Strikes. 17 It states, "the intent of the Legislature in enact-
ing subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, [is] to ensure longer prison
sentences and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and
have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent felony of-
fenses."18 Subdivision (c) limits courts' discretion in sentencing and
incarcerating defendants with one or more prior qualifying felony
convictions. 19 Subdivisions (f) (1) and (g) reduce prosecutorial discre-
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999); see also Luna, supra note 1, at 9.
13. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1999);
Luna, supra note 1, at 9.
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12.
16. See Luna, supra note 1, at 9-10 & n.70; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 6670).
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b).
18. Id.
19. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c). Section 667 provides:
Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and
it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior felony
convictions as defined in subdivision (d), the court shall adhere to each of the
following:
(1) There shall not be an aggregate term limitation for purposes of consecu-
tive sentencing for any subsequent felony conviction.
(2) Probation for the current offense shall not be granted, nor shall execu-
tion or imposition of the sentence be suspended for any prior offense.
(3) The length of time between the prior felony conviction and the current
felony conviction shall not affect the imposition of sentence.
(4) There shall not be a commitment to any other facility other than the
state prison. Diversion shall not be granted nor shall the defendant be eligible for
commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center ....
(5) The total amount of credits awarded... shall not exceed one-fifth of the
total term of imprisonment imposed and shall not accrue until the defendant is
physically placed in the state prison.
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tion, 20 and require prosecutors to apply Three Strikes by "plead[ing]
and prov[ing] each prior felony conviction" whenever the situation
warrants. 21 For example, a defendant with one or two prior serious or
violent felony convictions will automatically be treated as a two-strike
or three-strike offender respectively.2 2 Prosecutors cannot choose to
plea bargain or dismiss any prior felony convictions. 23
Subdivision (d) of section 667 defines a strike as a "violent" or"serious" felony under California Penal Code sections 667.5 and
1192.7.24 Prior felony convictions are strikes even if the prior sentence
was suspended, stayed, or the offender was committed to a mental
health facility instead of incarceration.2 5 A prior felony conviction
committed outside of California may also count as a strike if the crime
constitutes a violent or serious felony under California law.26 Prior ju-
venile adjudications are strikes if (1) the juvenile was 16 years of age
or older at the time he or she committed the prior offense; (2) the
(6) If there is a current conviction for more than one felony count not com-
mitted on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts,
the court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each count pursuant to
subdivision (e).
(7) If there is a current conviction for more than one serious or violent fel-
ony as described in paragraph (6), the court shall impose the sentence for each
conviction consecutive to the sentence for any other conviction for which the
defendant may be consecutively sentenced in the manner prescribed by law.
(8) Any sentence imposed pursuant to subdivision (e) will be imposed con-
secutive to any other sentence which the defendant is already serving, unless
otherwise provided by law.
Id.
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(1) and (g).
21. Id. But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(0 (2) (allowing for limited prosecutorial discre-
tion in the "furtherance of justice" or if there is insufficient evidence to prove a prior
felony conviction); People v. Romero, 917 P.2d 628, 648 (Cal. 1996) (holding a trial court
has limited discretion to strike a prior felony conviction under California Penal Code sec-
tion 1385 in the "interests of justice").
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(f)(1); see also Luna, supra note 1, at 10-11 (stating that
"[t]he prosecutor must 'plead and prove' all known prior serious or violent felony convic-
tions. In other words, Three Strikes must be employed whenever it could be applicable to a
defendant" (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(0 (1)).
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 66 7 (g); see also Luna, supra note 1, at 11.
24. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(1); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (West 1999) (de-
fining "violent" felonies); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (West Supp. 1999) (defining "seri-
ous" felonies).
25. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (1) (A)-(D). A suspended sentence is defined as: "A
conviction of a crime followed by a sentence that is given formally, but not actually served.
A suspended sentence in criminal law means in effect that defendant is not required at the
time sentence is imposed to serve the sentence." BLACK'S LAw DIcriONARY 1446 (6th ed.
1990). To stay a sentence "means to hold it in abeyance, or refrain from enforcing it." Id. at
1413 (6th ed. 1990)
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (2).
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prior offense constitutes a violent or serious felony as defined under
California Penal Code sections 667.5 and 1192.7 or Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code section 707; (3) the juvenile was subject to juvenile court
law; and (4) the juvenile was declared a ward of the juvenile court.2 7
Subdivision (e) sets forth the crucial substance of the Three
Strikes law. A criminal defendant with one prior strike (a serious or
violent felony conviction) will receive double the punishment for his
second strike.28 A criminal defendant with two prior strikes will re-
ceive the greater sentence of either three times the punishment for
the third offense or twenty-five years to life for his third strike. 29
B. People v. Benson-Factual Background
In 1979, at the age of eighteen, Benson was involved in a single
criminal incident that resulted in two felony convictions. 30 "According
to the probation officer's report, Benson resided in the same apart-
ment building as the female victim." 31 Benson entered the victim's
27. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3)(A)-(D).
28. See Cal. Penal Code § 667(e) (1). Subdivision (e) states:
For purposes of subdivisions (b) to (i) .... the following shall apply where a
defendant has a prior felony conviction:
(1) If a defendant has one prior felony conviction that has been pled and
proved, the determinate term or minimum term for an indeterminate term shall
be twice the term otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony
conviction.
(2) (A) If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions as defined in
subdivision (d) that have been pled and proved, the term for the current felony
conviction shall be an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of:
(i) Three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current
felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions.
(ii) Imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years.
(iii) ...
(B) The indeterminate term described in... (A) shall be served consecutive
to any other term of imprisonment for which a consecutive term may be imposed
by law. Any other term imposed subsequent to any indeterminate term described
in... (A) shall not be merged therein but shall commence at the time the person
would otherwise have been released from prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e). For example, a defendant with a prior conviction for robbery
has one "strike" on his record because robbery is a violent felony. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 667.5(c) (9). If the defendant commits any new felony, such as residential burglary, the
sentencing court doubles the punishment appropriate for that offense. See CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667(e) (1).
29. See Cal. Penal Code § 667(e) (2) (A).
30. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 558 (Cal. 1998); see also People v. Benson, 62
Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 692 (Ct. App. 1997), superseded by People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557 (Cal.
1998).
31. Benson, 954 P.2d at 558.
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apartment under the pretext of having left his keys in the apartment
earlier.32 Once inside, Benson grabbed the victim from behind and
stabbed her approximately twenty times.33 The victim survived the at-
tack and identified Benson as the assailant.3 4 Benson turned himself
in the next day and "was placed under arrest. '' 5 Ajury convicted Ben-
son of residential burglary and assault with intent to commit mur-
der.36 Both crimes qualified as strikes.3 7 Benson served his sentence in
state prison for the residential burglary charge.38 The court stayed the
assault conviction pursuant to section 654 of the California Penal
Code.3 9
Fifteen years later, in 1994, Benson "was arrested for shoplifting a
carton of cigarettes worth [twenty dollars] ($20).1140 For this offense,
Benson was charged with the crime of "petty theft with a prior," a
felony because of his 1979 burglary conviction. 41 Ajury convicted Ben-
son.42 The court determined that the "petty theft with a prior" felony
conviction constituted his third "strike," sentencing Benson to state





36. See id. at 559. Benson was also charged with second degree robbery and burglary.
See Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692 n.4. "The jury found [Benson] not guilty of robbery and
deadlocked on the charge of commercial burglary which was dismissed. Id.
37. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (18) (West Supp. 1999) (defining residential bur-
glary as a "serious felony"); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(c) (12) (West 1999) (defining
attempted murder as a "violent felony"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b)-(i) (West 1999) (stat-
ing violent felonies and serious felonies are considered strikes).
38. See Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692.
39. See id. at 692 n.2.
40. Benson, 954 P.2d at 558.
41. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West 1999). Section 666 provides:
Every person who, having been convicted of petit theft, grand theft, auto theft
under Section 10851 of the Vehicle Code, burglary, carjacking, robbery, or a fel-
ony violation of Section 496 and having served a term therefor in any penal insti-
tution or having been imprisoned therein as a condition of probation for that
offense, is subsequently convicted of petit theft, then the person convicted of that
subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceed-
ing one year, or in the state prison.
Id. (emphasis added).
42. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 558.
43. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (2) (A) (ii) (West 1999).
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C. People v. Fuhrman-Factual Background
Fuhrman's initial case involved a series of events arising out of a
single course of criminal conduct in 1989. 44 While driving a stolen car,
Fuhrman crashed into another car, assaulted the driver with a
weapon, and then forced the driver of a nearby truck to drive him
away from the scene, later stealing the truck from the driver.45 For
these actions, Fuhrman was charged with eleven crimes.46 He plead
guilty to two, robbery and assault with a firearm; the others were dis-
missed as part of a plea bargain.47
In 1994, the police arrested Fuhrman again. 48 The District Attor-
ney charged Fuhrman with robbery and unlawfully driving or taking
an automobile. 49 A jury convicted him of both felonies. 50 The prose-
cutor pled and proved that Fuhrman had two prior felony convictions
(strikes) from the earlier 1989 crimes. 51 These two prior strikes re-
quired the trial court to sentence Fuhrman under Three Strikes on
both counts. 52 Fuhrman received a sentence of fifty-eight years to life
in prison. 53
H. Double-Counting-Counting a Single Incident as Two
Strikes
Double-counting occurs when an indivisible course of criminal
conduct or bad act is counted twice. In the Three Strikes context, this
translates into two prior felony convictions stemming from a single
act, thereby constituting two "strikes" instead of one. As Benson and
Fuhrman drastically illustrate, the possibility exists that a second-time
offender will be sentenced as a three-strike offender, receiving not a
double sentence for the current felony but a much harsher twenty-five
years to life sentence. 54 Although each defendant's recidivism in-








52. See id, On the robbery offense, the court imposed a sentence of twenty-five Years to
life and on count two, the vehicle-taking offense, the court also imposed a sentence of
twenty-five years to life. See id.
53. See id. The court calculated the remaining eight years based on Fuhrman's
weapon-use enhancement, prior serious felony, and prior prison terms. See id.
54. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 570 (Cal. 1998) (Chin, J., dissenting). A de-
fendant with one prior serious or violent felony conviction will receive a doubled sentence
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volved only two separate bad acts ("crime one" resulting in two or
more felony convictions and "crime two" resulting in one or more fel-
ony convictions), the trial court sentenced Benson and Fuhrman as
third-strike recidivists. 55
California law provides precedential and statutory support for dis-
continuing the current practice of double-counting. For instance, Cal-
ifornia law prohibits a defendant convicted of several crimes based on a
single act or indivisible course of conduct from being punished sepa-
rately for each of those crimes ("multiple punishment").56 Whenever
a defendant contends that the trial court erroneously punished him
for more than one conviction, the discussion at the appellate court
level usually centers on issues concerning California's prohibition
against multiple punishment and not double-counting per se. Never-
theless, in light of the California Supreme Court's decisions in Fuhr-
man and Benson, whether a defendant can obtain an appropriate
sentence based on a double-counting argument seems unlikely.
A. California Penal Code Section 654-Prohibition Against
Multiple Punishment
California Penal Code section 654, enacted in 1872, provides: "An
act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provi-
sions of law shall be punished.., but in no case shall the act or omis-
sion be punished under more than one provision. '57 This section
prohibits multiple sentences where a defendant commits an individ-
ual criminal act giving rise to multiple convictions and where a de-
fendant engages in multiple acts or an indivisible course of conduct
motivated by a single intent or objective. 58 For instance, if a defendant
is convicted of two offenses arising out of one act, such as robbery and
kidnapping for purposes of robbery, a court can only punish the de-
fendant for one of the two offenses under section 654. 59
for his second felony conviction and a defendant with two prior serious or violent felony
convictions will receive a sentence of twenty-five years to life for his third felony conviction.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(1)-(2) (West 1999).
55. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 565 (Chin, J., dissenting); see also Fuhrman, 941 P.2d at
1192. Recidivist is defined as: "A habitual criminal; a criminal repeater. An incorrigible
criminal. One who makes a trade of crime." BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990).
56. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1999).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654(a).
58. See People v. Pearson, 721 P.2d 595, 599 (Cal. 1986); see also MENASTER & RIC-
CIARDULLI, supra note 9, at 28-29.
59. See People v. Norrell, 913 P.2d 458, 461 (Cal. 1996). "[ I ] f multiple offenses com-
mitted by a defendant were 'incident to one objective,' the defendant 'may be punished
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To comply with section 654, California courts have consistently
stayed the sentence associated with all but one of the convictions,
rather than setting aside all but one of the convictions.60 The stay pro-
cedure "avoid[s] the potentially unfair consequences to the state of
refusing to allow multiple convictions: 'if [a trial court] dismisses the
count carrying the lesser penalty, and the conviction on the remain-
ing count should be reversed on appeal, the defendant would stand
with no conviction at all."' 61 Thus, the modern procedure of using a
stay avoids multiple punishment and protects against injustice to the
state by ensuring the defendant does not receive a windfall should a
count be reversed. 62 The stay procedure "affords the appellant the
maximum protection to which section 654 entitles him and, under no
condition, can operate to his prejudice." 63
B. Pearson-A Stayed Conviction May Not Be Used To Enhance a
Defendant's Subsequent Sentence
In People v. Pearson,64 the jury convicted the defendant of two
counts of lewd conduct 65 and two counts of sodomy with a child under
fourteen. 66 The trial court then imposed a sentence for the two lewd
conduct convictions but stayed the two sodomy convictions to avoid
double punishment for the same act under section 654.67 On appeal,
the California Supreme Court affirmed all four convictions. 68
The Pearson court considered a request by the defendant to "pro-
hibit the use of more than one conviction based on each of his crimi-
for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.'" Id. (quoting Neal v. State of Califor-
nia, 357 P.2d 839, 844 (Cal. 1960)).
60. See Pearson, 721 P.2d at 600; see also People v. Niles, 39 Cal. Rptr. 11, 15 (Ct. App.
1964). In Niles, the California Court of Appeal was the first California appellate court to
stay execution of sentence to avoid multiple punishment. See Pearson, 721 P.2d at 600. The
California Supreme Court later indicated its approval of the stay procedure. See In re
Wright, 422 P.2d 998, 1002 n.4 (Cal. 1967). See also supra, note 25 for the definition of a
stayed sentence.
61. Pearson, 721 P.2d at 600 (quoting Niles, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 15) (alteration in original).
62. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 566-68 (Cal. 1998) (Chin, J., dissenting).
63. Niles, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 15 (emphasis added).
64. 721 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1986).
65. See Pearson, 721 P.2d at 596; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West 1999) (defin-
ing lewd conduct).
66. See Pearson, 721 P.2d at 596; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(c) (West 1999).
67. See Pearson, 721 P.2d at 596.
68. See id. at 596. The defendant appealed his convictions for reasons unrelated to this
Comment. The defendant argued for reversal on grounds that a "defendant may not be
convicted of both a greater and lesser included offense" and that "statutory sodomy...
includes the lesser offense of lewd conduct ... " Id. The California Supreme Court re-
jected these contentions. See id. at 599.
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nal acts for the purpose of enhancing any subsequent sentence he
may receive." 69 Having sustained four separate convictions for two acts
(sodomy and lewd conduct), the defendant feared an enhancement
of a future conviction on the basis of his four convictions and not the
two acts. 70 The defendant contended such future enhancements based
on all of his present convictions would violate section 654's prohibi-
tion against multiple punishment.7'
After conceding the prematurity of the request, 72 the court held:
Any subsequent sentences imposed on defendant can be enhanced
on the basis of the convictions for which he served a sentence; but
convictions for which service of sentence was stayed may not be so
used unless the Legislature explicitly declares that subsequent penal or ad-
ministrative action may be based on such stayed convictions. Without
such a declaration, it is clear that section 654 prohibits defendant
from being disadvantaged in any way as a result of the stayed
convictions. 73
The court relied on a series of decisions by the California appel-
late courts-People v. Avila,7 4 People v. Duarte,75 People v. Conner,76 and
People v. Osuna 77-and a California Supreme Court case, In re Wright.78
In Avila, the trial court stayed execution of all but one of the defend-
ant's sentences and committed him to the California Youth Authority
("CYA"). 79 The CYA disqualified the defendant from commitment on
grounds that one of his stayed felony convictions made him ineligible
for the CYA.80 After the CYA rejected the defendant, the trial court set
69. Id at 599 (emphasis added).
70. See id. Enhancement statutes, such as California Penal Code sections 667(a),
667.51 (a), and 667.6(a), compel five-year sentence enhancements on each prior conviction
for certain offenses if a defendant is convicted in the future. See id.
71. See id
72. See id. In Justice Lucas' concurring opinion he called the majority opinion "advi-
sory" because it chose to decide whether using the defendant's convictions in the future
constituted multiple punishment. See id. at 603 (Lucas, J., concurring). "That issue will not
arise until defendant has committed, and suffered a conviction for, some future offense for
which such an enhancement might be appropriate." Id (Lucas, J., concurring). Justice
Lucas found no "valid purpose" in "assuring [the] defendant that, if he chooses to commit
such an offense, his enhanced punishment will not be as severe as he might have feared[.]"
Id. (Lucas, J., concurring).
73. Pearson, 721 P.2d at 600-01 (emphasis added).
74. 188 Cal. Rptr. 754 (Ct. App. 1982).
75. 207 Cal. Rptr. 615 (Ct. App. 1984).
76. 222 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Ct. App. 1986).
77. 207 Cal. Rptr. 641 (Ct. App. 1984).
78. 422 P.2d 998 (Cal. 1967).
79. See Avila, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
80. See id. at 755-56.
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aside the commitment and sentenced him to prison.81 On appeal, the
court directed reinstatement of the commitment and explained that
the stay procedure "was accepted as compatible with the prohibition
against multiple punishment because it was assumed no incremental
punishment can flow from the stayed sentences.' '8 2 "If the stayed sen-
tence ... is construed to preclude a CYA commitment, the effect is the
forbidden punishment."8 3 The California Supreme Court in Pearson
agreed with the court of appeal's reasoning in Avila and went on to
explain that "if defendant here were subjected to future sentence en-
hancements based on his stayed convictions, this would also constitute
the type of 'incremental punishment' that section 654 forbids."8 4
The Pearson court also relied on the appellate court's decision in
Duarte to restrict the potential application of enhancement statutes to
stayed convictions. 85 In Duarte, the trial court convicted the defendant
of two counts of driving under the influence for a single drunk driving
act and stayed one of the convictions pursuant to section 654.86 To
avoid the possibility of the stayed conviction's use as a prior conviction
in a future proceeding under an enhancement statute, the court
stayed the use of the conviction so that it could never count as a prior
felony conviction for penal and administrative purposes.87
The Pearson court then noted that the court of appeal in Conner
followed Duarte by staying the use of a conviction to comply with sec-
tion 654.88 The court also relied on Osuna, in which the court of ap-
peal went further than did the courts in Avila, Duarte, or Conner, by
reversing one of the defendant's lesser convictions out of fear that it
would be used in a later proceeding to enhance a sentence he may
receive. 89
In sum, the Pearson court and other California cases strongly ad-
monish the use of stayed felony convictions to increase a defendant's
subsequent sentence when proof of a prior felony conviction becomes
necessary for sentencing purposes. This line of decisions, coupled
with section 654's mandate against multiple punishment, prompts one
to consider two questions. First, should a prior felony conviction that
81. See id, at 756.
82. Id. at 757.
83. Id,
84. People v. Pearson, 721 P.2d 595, 601 (Cal. 1986).
85. See id. at 601-02.
86. See People v. Duarte, 207 Cal. Rptr. 615, 617, 621 (Ct. App. 1984).
87. See id. at 622.
88. See Pearson, 721 P.2d at 602.
89. See id.
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has been stayed count as a strike under Three Strikes? Second, assum-
ing the stayed conviction counts as a strike, is there some other basis
in the law for allowing multiple convictions stemming from an indivisi-
ble course of conduct to count as more than one strike? The defense
lawyers in Benson and Fuhrman tried to answer these questions in the
negative. To hold otherwise, the lawyers argued, would violate section
654, precedent, and the stated purpose of recidivist statutes like Three
Strikes.9 0
C. Benson-A Stayed Sentence on a Prior Felony Conviction
Qualifies as a Strike
In People v. Benson, the specific issue before the California
Supreme Court was whether a prior serious or violent felony, for
which the sentence was stayed pursuant to California Penal Code sec-
tion 654, qualified as a strike under Three Strikes.91 On appeal, Ben-
son contended his two prior felony convictions should not have
counted as separate strikes because the trial court determined they
were committed as part of an indivisible transaction with a single in-
tent against a single victim. 92 Benson argued it would be irrational and
against Three Strikes principles93 to count his one "act" as two strikes,
particularly because the crimes flowing from that act were punished as
a single crime pursuant to section 654.94
In rejecting Benson's arguments, the majority distinguished
Three Strikes from section 654 and focused on the legislature's and
electorate's intent in enacting Three Strikes. 95 Section 654's prohibi-
tion against multiple punishment for "'an act or omission that is pun-
90. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 559-62 (Cal. 1998); see also People v. Fuhr-
man, 941 P.2d 1189, 1195-96 (Cal. 1997).
91. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 558.
92. See id. at 559.
93. See id. at 563. Presumably, these principles include a consideration of the purpose
for having a recidivist statute. See infra Part IV.A., for a discussion of the purpose behind
recidivist statutes. Treating Benson as a three-time offender versus a two-time offender
runs contrary to those principles. See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 18, People v. Ben-
son, 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998) (No. S061678). "If the offender has committed [only] one
prior 'act', he or she is eligible for enhanced sentencing as a 'second striker.' But that
individual simply has not committed the repeated criminal acts required as a condition for
the imposition of the harshest sentence provided by [Three Strikes]." Id. (emphasis
added).
94. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 563; see also supra Part II.A, for a discussion of California
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ishable in different ways,' ' 96 the majority reasoned, stood in stark
contrast from Three Strikes' focus on a defendant's recidivism-i.e.,
whether the defendant committed another felony after having been
convicted of one or more prior qualifying felonies.97 The majority
concluded that a rational basis existed for the electorate and the legis-
lature to direct the courts to count each prior felony conviction as a
strike, "in effect declining to extend the leniency previously afforded
to [Benson] when [his] sentence on a prior felony conviction was
stayed pursuant to section 654."98 According to the majority, sentenc-
ing Benson as a Three Strikes offender was justified because Benson's
two prior convictions involved a felony (residential burglary) with ad-
ditional violence (assault with intent to commit murder).9° The court
concluded the legislature and the electorate had sound justification
for sentencing someone in Benson's position harshly because his
prior crimes demonstrated that he "posed a far greater threat to pub-
lic safety than a defendant who has committed a residential burglary
without committing such gratuitous violence." 100
In support of his contention that he should only receive one
strike for the 1980 convictions, Benson argued that Three Strikes did
not comply with the rule set forth in People v. Pearson.10 He argued
the Legislature must explicitly declare that subsequent penal action
can be based on stayed sentences; therefore, his stayed conviction
should not count as a strike. 10 2 The language in Three Strikes stated
that a "stay of execution of sentence" on a prior felony conviction
would not affect the determination by that court as whether or not it
was a strike.10 3 Benson argued that to comply with Pearson, a more
96. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
97. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 563.
98. Id. at 563-64.
In the present case, defendant received the benefit of section 654 when he was
sentenced for the felonies he committed in 1979; it was only when the defendant
reoffended after the enactment of the Three Strikes law that he faced the prolonged incarcera-
tion of which he now complains. The Three Strikes law provided him with notice that
he would be treated as a recidivist if he reoffended. [citation omitted] He chose to
ignore that notice and commit a subsequent felony.
Id. at 564.
99. See id. at 564.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 559-61; see also supra Part II.B., for a discussion of the Pearson decision.
102. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 561.
103. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (West 1999). Section 667(d) provides:
(d) Notwithstanding any other law and for the purpose of subdivisions (b) to (i),
inclusive, a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined as:
(1) Any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a violent felony
or any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in
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adequate interpretation of the phrase "stay of execution of sentence"
would be "stay of execution of sentence except those stays mandated by
section 654."104 Such a general use of the term "stay," Benson argued,
did not adequately refer specifically to stays granted under section 654
and, therefore, it violated the Pearson rule. 105
The majority rejected this argument, claiming that it defied the
rules of statutory construction to ignore the statute's plain lan-
guage. 10 6 The court found "it difficult . . . to imagine language
clearer, or more unequivocal" than that set forth in the statute and
determined that the language clearly permitted a stayed felony convic-
tion to be used as a strike. 10 7 The court added that the broad language
of section 667(d) included all stays of execution, including those
granted under section 654, because it "defies logic" to suggest the leg-
islature and the electorate intended to reference only some stays, and
not others, in drafting the exception.10 8 The court interpreted the in-
troductory clause "[n]otwithstanding any other law" to prohibit the
Pearson rule from being applied. Therefore, the court held, a stayed
sentence on a prior felony conviction qualifies as a strike. 10 9
D. Fuhrman--Prior Felony Convictions Need Not Be Brought and
Tried Separately to Qualify as Strikes
In People v. Fuhrman, the issue before the California Supreme
Court was whether prior felony convictions that were not "brought
this state .... None of the following dispositions shall affect the determination that a prior
conviction is a prior felony for purposes of subdivision (b) to (i), inclusive:
(B) The stay of execution of sentence.
Id. (emphasis added).
104. Benson, 954 P.2d at 561.
105. See id. at 562.
106. See id. at 561-62.
107. Id. at 561. The court also examined the language contained in the ballot pam-
phlet and the Senate Judiciary Committee reports and determined it was not the intent of
the legislature or the electorate to dismiss prior felony convictions that had been stayed
pursuant to section 654 from a determination that they qualify as strikes. See id at 562-63.
108. Id. at 562-63. The majority relied on judicial precedent which held that the legis-
lature need not cite to section 654 specifically to create an exception to the prohibition
against multiple punishment. See id.; see also People v. Hicks, 863 P.2d 714, 718-20 (Cal.
1993) (holding the phrase "whether or not committed during a single transaction" in the
statute is sufficient to create an exception to section 654); People v. Ramirez, 39 Cal. Rptr.
2d 374, 382-83 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding "[a] statute which provides that a defendant shall
receive a sentence enhancement in addition to any other authorized punishment consti-
tutes an express exception to section 654"); People v. Powell, 281 Cal. Rptr. 568, 569 (Ct.
App. 1991) (holding specific provisions prevail over general provisions).
109. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 561, 565.
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and tried separately" count as separate strikes under the Three Strikes
law. 110 Brought and tried separately means "a prior conviction must
have been brought and tried separately from another qualifying con-
viction in order to be counted as a separate strike." '111 On appeal,
Fuhrman contended that his two prior 1989 felony convictions for
robbery and assault with a firearm, arising from an earlier, single pro-
ceeding, should not qualify as strikes since they were not brought and
tried separately from each other.112 Fuhrman argued the two prior
felony convictions constituted one strike for sentencing purposes
under Three Strikes. 1 3 In support of his contention, Fuhrman argued
that section 667 of the California Penal Code used the term "prior
conviction" ambiguously.' 14 Fuhrman pointed to subdivision (a) (1) of
section 667,115 which specifically provided for a brought and tried sep-
arately requirement, while such language was absent in subdivisions
(b) through (i) of section 667.116 Fuhrman further argued that the
resulting doubt should be resolved in his favor, allowing the court to
impose a brought and tried separately requirement. 117
The majority rejected Fuhrman's arguments by relying on gen-
eral rules of statutory construction. 118 If the statute contains clear and
unambiguous language, the majority noted, then the court should
give effect to that language and not go beyond the statute's text.119
First, the majority found that because Three Strikes did not explicitly
provide for a "brought and tried separately" requirement, the legisla-
ture must not have intended such a provision. 120 Secondly, the major-
ity found no ambiguity between subdivision (a) of section 667, and
110. See People v. Fuhrman, 941 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Cal. 1997).
111. Luna, supra, note 1 at 49.
112. See Fuhrman, 941 P.2d at 1192.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1193-94.
115. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a) (1) (West 1999). Section 667(a) (1) pro-
vides that:
[A] ny person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been convicted of a
serious felony in this state or of any offense committed in another jurisdiction
which includes all of the elements of any serious felony, shall receive, in addition
to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year enhance-
ment for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately. The
terms of the present offense and each enhancement shall run consecutively.
Id. (emphasis added).
116. See Fuhrman, 941 P.2d at 1193-94; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b)-(i) (West
1999).
117. See Fuhrman, 941 P.2d at 1194.
118. See id. at 1193-4.
119. See id. at 1193.
120. See id. at 1194-95.
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subdivisions (b) through (i) of section 667.121 The majority reasoned
that because subdivision (a) contains an explicit reference to a
brought and tried separately requirement, the legislature purposely
excluded such a requirement in the other subdivisions. 122 Such an
absence, the majority determined, indicated the legislature did not
intend it as a requirement.1 23 The majority then held that prior vio-
lent or serious felony convictions brought and tried together in a sin-
gle proceeding qualified as separate strikes.1 24 Thus Fuhrman's two
prior felony convictions counted as two separate strikes. 125
E. Summary
Interpreting the Three Strikes law as allowing only one strike per
act coincides with the purpose of Three Strikes generally, 126 with sec-
tion 654, and the Pearson decision.1 27 However, the California
Supreme Court in Benson rejected this interpretation by finding that
stayed sentences constitute strikes.1 28 Justice Chin warned in his dis-
senting opinion about the "practical consequences" of the Benson de-
cision, including the possibility of multiple strikes arising out of a
single act.'29 When asked about this problem during oral argument,
the Attorney General responded that the trial court could dismiss the"excess convictions" to avoid multiple strikes.1 30 However, the Attor-
ney General's solution defeats the purpose of the stay procedure be-
121. See id. at 1194.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id at 1195.
125. See i&t
126. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 565 (Cal. 1998) (Chin, J., dissenting). "The
'Three Strikes' law, designed to punish habitual criminals severely, provides much harsher
penalties for the recidivist who has committed two or more previous serious or violent
crimes, or 'strikes,' than for the recidivist who has committed only one previous qualifying
crime." Id.
127. See id, at 565-66 (Chin, J., dissenting).
128. See id at 558.
129. See id, at 570 (Chin, J., dissenting). Justice Chin posited an example:
[S]uppose a person stops a pedestrian at knifepoint and demands a watch. Based
solely on that act, the person could conceivably be convicted of felony false im-
prisonment, assault with a deadly weapon, and attempted robbery. Because each
conviction would involve personal use of a deadly weapon, each could, individu-




cause dismissal of convictions causes the same problems the stay
procedure was designed to remedy. 131
By determining that criminal defendants who commit "additional
violence" during a single act should later receive two strikes instead of
one,13 2 the majority in Benson double counted the bad act.133 Addi-
tionally, under the majority's logic, a defendant faced with his third
strike who had two prior non-violent felony convictions stemming from
an earlier single proceeding should receive only one strike and not two
because there was no "additional act of violence."134 The arbitrariness
of double-counting the bad act based on the existence or nonexis-
tence of violence belies the weakness of the majority's reasoning in
Benson.
Similarly, the Fuhrman court incorrectly refused to find a brought
and tried separately requirement in the Three Strikes law. This re-
quirement would demand that a prior conviction be tried in a separate
judicial proceeding in order for it to count as a separate strike. 135
Three Strikes and recidivist statutes punish more severely persons who
persist in violating the law.136 By prohibiting double-counting and im-
posing a brought and tried separately requirement, offenders like
131. See id.; see also supra Part II.A. and B., for a discussion regarding section 654 and
the Pearson decision.
132. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 564.
133. In Benson, the defendant committed the burglary for the purpose of committing
the assault. In contrast to the majority, Justice Chin argued that Benson did not commit an
additional act of violence because he did not commit the burglary for a different purpose,
such as theft. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 571 (Chin, J., dissenting); see also Dawn Philippus,
Note, California's Foul Strike: A Single Act Punished With Two Strikes, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
Riv. 579, 619 (1999) (stating "[u]nder California's single felonious purpose doctrine,
when the entry would be non-felonious but for the intent to commit the assault, and the
assault is an integral part of the burglary, the defendant has committed only a single act").
"Therefore, Benson had no criminal intent separate from the assault itself, and committed
only one act of violence." See id. at 619.
134. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 564; see also supra text accompanying note 100.
135. See Luna, supra note 1, at 49.
136. See, e.g., People v. Balderas, 711 P.2d 480, 514 (Cal. 1985) (stating the rationale of
recidivist laws "is that an offender undeterred by his prior brushes with the law deserves more
severe criminal treatment"); People v. Diaz, 53 Cal. Rptr. 666, 668 n.1 (Ct. App. 1966)
(finding "the reason for the infliction of severer punishment for a repetition of offenses is not so much
that defendant has sinned more than once as that he is deemed incorrigible when he persists in viola-
tions of the law after conviction of previous infractions") (quoting Annotation, Chronologi-
cal or procedural sequence of former convictions as affecting enhancement of penalty for subsequent
offense under habitual criminal statutes, 24 A.L.R.2d 1247, 1248-49 (1952)).
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Fuhrman and Benson would not be punished as harshly as someone
with a stronger track record of prior, separate bad acts. 137
With fewer bad acts and less evidence of earlier, ineffective crimi-
nal sanctions, the decision to remove someone from society indefi-
nitely on the basis of double-counting his or her bad act distorts the
reason for having a recidivist statute in the first place. 138 By not find-
ing a brought and tried separately requirement, and allowing stayed
sentences to count as strikes, the California Supreme court did not
reserve the harshest sanctions for the truly intractable offenders. 139
Instead, it allowed for more offenders to be caught in the "strike
zone" of Three Strikes. 140
I. Dual Use-Counting a Prior Felony Conviction Twice
An example of dual use occurs when a prior felony conviction
both ratchets a current misdemeanor to a felony (use one) and counts
as a strike under Three Strikes (use tWO). 1 4 1 For instance, in Benson,
shoplifting a carton of cigarettes was charged as "petty theft with a
prior," a felony. 142 His misdemeanor offense, petty theft, became a
felony because of his prior felony convictions, and also counted as his
third strike.1 43 While the California Supreme Court has prohibited
dual use of a prior felony conviction, 144 whether California's Three
Strikes law violates the rule against dual use has not yet been squarely
decided by the California Supreme Court.145
137. See Daniel Rogers, People v. Fuhrman and Three Strikes: Have the Traditional Goals of
Recidivist Sentencing Been Sacrificed at the Altar of Public Passion ?, 20 THOMASJEFFERSON L. REv.
139, 152-53 (1998).
138. See id. at 156-57.
139. See, e.g., People v. Goodwin, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 576, 577 (Ct. App. 1997). The de-
fendant received twenty-five years to life for stealing a pair of pants-his third strike under
California Penal Code section 666-the two strike priors arose from residential burglaries
in a single, prior proceeding.
140. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 152-54.
141. See People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557, 558-59 (Cal. 1998). Benson's current misde-
meanor offense, petty theft, became a felony of "petty theft with a prior" because he had a
prior felony conviction; the prior felony conviction also counted as a "strike" within the
Three Strikes' sentencing scheme. See id. at 558. See also supra text accompanying note 9.
142. See supra Parts I.B and II.C, for discussions of the Benson case.
143. See id.
144. See People v. Edwards, 557 P.2d 995, 999 (Cal. 1976).
145. See People v. Tillman, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 56, 65-66, 68 (Ct. App. 1999). The Califor-
nia Supreme Court has rejected challenges to the Three Strikes law as an improper dual
use of facts under California Penal Code section 654; People v. Coronado, 906 P.2d 1232,
1238-40 (Cal. 1995); see also supra Part II.A., for a discussion of section 654.
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A. Edwards-The Rule Against Dual Use of Prior Felony
Convictions
Almost twenty years prior to the enactment of Three Strikes, the
California Supreme Court's holding in People v. Edwards14 6 prohibited
the dual use of a prior felony conviction to prove an element of the
charged offense and to increase a sentence.1 47 For instance, if a dis-
trict attorney charges a criminal defendant with the crime of "posses-
sion of a firearm by a felon," the defendant's prior felony conviction
establishes the felon element of the crime. Since the definition of the
crime takes into account the defendant's prior felony conviction al-
ready, presumably the legislature did not intend the same prior felony
conviction to increase punishment under another statute. 148 In the
Three Strikes context this would occur if the defendant's prior felony
conviction was an element of the charged offense and counted as a
strike. Such dual use of prior convictions, Edwards explained, "runs
afoul of the established rule that when a prior conviction constitutes
an element of criminal conduct which otherwise would be noncrimi-
nal [i.e., status of the offender], the minimum sentence may not be
increased because of the indispensable prior conviction."1 49
146. 557 P.2d 995 (Cal. 1976). In Edwards, the defendant was convicted of possession of
a firearm by a felon and the prosecution subsequently proved that defendant had a prior
felony conviction for selling marijuana. Edward's prior marijuana conviction was used to
establish the felon element of the charged offense and was used under California Penal
Code section 3024 to increase his sentence by two years because he had a prior felony
conviction. The ultimate disposition of the case, under the holding set forth by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, allowed Edwards' prior marijuana conviction to be used to establish
the element of the charged crime but disallowed its use as a basis to increase his sentence
under section 3024. See id. at 999.
147. See id
148. See People v. Baird, 906 P.2d 1220, 1228 (Cal. 1995) (Kennard, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing In re Shull, 146 P.2d 417, 419 (Cal. 1944)).
[T]he "established rule" prohibiting use of a single fact to both establish an ele-
ment of a crime and increase the punishment for the same crime is a rule of
legislative intent. It is based on the commonsense idea that when a fact, such as
defendant's prior felony conviction, is part of the definition of crime, the punish-
ment specified for that crime already takes that fact into account.
Baird, 906 P.2d at 1228.
149. Edwards, 557 P.2d at 999. Cf People v. Yarborough, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402, 403-04
(Ct. App. 1999). In Yarborough, the defendant pled guilty for failing to register as a sex
offender. See id. at 403. The defendant had earlier been convicted of child molestation. See
id. This conviction constituted a prior serious felony within the Three Strikes law. See id As
it was the defendant's second strike, his prison term was doubled under Three Strikes. See
id. On appeal, Yarborough contended the use of his prior child molestation conviction as
an element of the offense for failing to register as a sex offender and to double his punish-
ment under Three Strikes violated the Edwards rule. See id. The court distinguished the
facts in Edwards from the facts in Yarborough. See id. at 404. In Edwards, the defendant had a
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In People v. Baird,150 Justice Kennard analogized this general rule
to that of an accountant preparing a financial statement:
To accurately portray the client's financial position, the accountant
must count each asset or liability once and only once. If an asset
were to be counted more than once, the total on the credit side
would be exaggerated and inaccurate. If a liability were counted
more than once, the debit side of the statement would be similarly
inaccurate and exaggerated. So also with the "accounting" that
goes into a sentence calculation. Ideally, to accurately assess the
defendant's culpability, each relevant aggravating and mitigating
circumstance should be counted once, but only once. Any double
counting, on either the aggravating or mitigating side, or any omis-
sion, will yield a distorted and inaccurate picture of the defend-
ant's culpability. 151
Edwards' applicability depends upon a determination of whether
Three Strikes constitutes an enhancement and on whether the Ed-
wards' rule remains good law after the adoption of determinate
sentencing.
1. Whether Edwards Is an Enhancement or Alternative Sentencing
Scheme
The Edwards rule, if applied to Three Strikes, would disallow a
prior felony conviction from being used both as an element of a de-
fendant's current felony and as a strike. The Edwards rule specifically
prohibits dual use of a prior felony conviction as an element of an
offense and as a means to enhance a defendant's sentence.1 52 Edwards'
applicability to Three Strikes depends on a determination of whether
the Three Strikes sentencing provisions constitute an enhancement 153
or merely a separate sentencing scheme for recidivists.
prior conviction for selling marijuana and was later convicted of being a felon in posses-
sion of a firearm. See id. Because possession of a firearm is not in and of itself a crime unless
someone is an ex-felon, and because it is an "act," the court distinguished it from the facts
in Yarborough because defendant's non-registry as a sex offender constituted an "omission"
and is itself an illegal act. See id. The court concluded that the Edwards rule applies only in
cases in which the new offense is not "inherently criminal." See id. Recently, the Tillman
court expressed its disagreement with the reasoning of the Yarborough decision and con-
cluded that the Edwards rule does not require the conduct constituting the current offense
to be non-criminal but for the prior conviction. See Tillman, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 66-67.
150. 906 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1995).
151. See Baird, 906 P.2d at 1228 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
152. See supra Part III.A., for a discussion of the Edwards rule.
153. See CAL. R. CT. 405(c) (Deering 1999). An "'enhancement' is an additional term
of imprisonment added to the base term." Id. A "'base term' is the determinate prison
term selected from among three possible terms described by statute or the determinate
prison term prescribed by law if a range of three possible terms is not prescribed." C.. R.
CT. 405(b) (Deering 1999).
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Since the passage of Three Strikes in 1994, California appellate
courts confronted with the issue have determined that the sentencing
provisions of Three Strikes 154 establish an alternate sentencing
scheme and not an enhancement. 155 The implication of finding
Three Strikes as an alternate sentencing scheme means the Edwards
rule does not apply to Three Strikes.
The California Court of Appeal for the First District, Division
Two, in People v. Tillman,156 recently parted company with the earlier
court of appeal decisions that found Three Strikes to be an alternate
sentencing scheme and not an enhancement. 157 The Tillman court
noted that the court of appeals' reliance on the definition of "en-
hancement," as defined by the California Rules of Court, ignored the
factual and legal context in which the Edwards case was decided. 158
Edwards was simply concerned with "increasing punishment on the ba-
sis of the same fact used to convict a defendant. ' 159 The Tillman court
found that only a semantic difference existed between the terms "en-
hancement" and "alternate sentencing scheme."1 60 Setting aside the
semantic differences, the court found the Edwards' rule applied to
Three Strikes because "use of a single prior conviction as an element
of a substantive offense and as a strike obviously increases the defend-
ant's sentence on the basis of that prior conviction." 161
In People v. Hernandez,162 the California Supreme Court echoed
the Tillman court's view that the term "enhancement" has more mean-
ing than the definition under the California Rules of Court would in-
dicate. 163 According to the court,
Enhancements typically focus on an element of the commission of
the crime or the criminal history of the defendant which is not
154. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (West 1999); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(c)
(West Supp. 1999).
155. See, e.g., People v. White Eagle, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749, 752-53 (Ct. App. 1996);
People v. Anderson, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 474, 478-79 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Ingram, 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d 256, 266 (Ct. App. 1995);); People v. Martin, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 781-82 (Ct.
App. 1995), disapproved on other grounds by People v. Deloza, 957 P.2d 945, 954 n.10 (Cal.
1998); People v. McKee, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 707, 711 (Ct. App. 1995) People v. Nobleton, 44
Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 614 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Sipe, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 266, 276 (Ct. App.
1995.
156. 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 56 (Ct. App. 1999).
157. See id. at 68.
158. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 154, defining enhancement.
159. Tillman, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 68.
160. See id.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. 757 P.2d 1013 (Cal. 1988).
163. See id. at 1020-21.
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present for all such crimes and perpetrators and which justifies a
higher penalty than that prescribed for the offenses themselves.
That is one of the very purposes of an enhancement's existence. 164
2. Whether Edwards Is Viable After the Adoption of Determinate
Sentencing
People v. Bruno165 was the first California court of appeal case to
conclude that the Edwards rule, decided in 1976, did not survive the
adoption of determinate sentencing in 1977.166 Several other Califor-
nia courts of appeal decisions followed Bruno, reasoning that the Uni-
form Sentencing Act superseded Edwards.167
The Uniform Sentencing Act, codified at California Penal Code
section 1170,168 originally included a sentence providing that "[i] n no
event shall any fact be used twice to determine, aggravate, or enhance
a sentence."' 69 The Bruno court interpreted this sentence as codifying
the Edwards rule. 170 Prior to the operative date of the Act, the Legisla-
ture deleted the sentence by amendment.1 7 1 Bruno, and the later cases
that followed it, viewed the Legislature's action as "'eliminat[ing] the
Edwards rule by first codifying it and then deleting the codifica-
tion." 172 Thus, the Bruno line of cases determined that the Edwards'
rule no longer existed.
In People v. Darwin,173 the California Court of Appeal for the First
District, Division Five, rejected the reasoning behind the Bruno line of
cases 174 on the grounds that the original version of California Penal
Code section 1170 did not in fact codify the Edwards rule. Therefore,
the legislative action in deleting the supposed rule did not abrogate
the rule. 175 Edwards held that if a prior conviction is an "element" of
164. Id. at 1021.
165. 237 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Ct. App. 1987).
166. See People v. Tillman, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 56, 65 (Ct. App. 1999); see also CAL. PENAL
CODE §1170 (West Supp. 1999) (the Uniform Sentencing Act).
167. See People v. Nobleton, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 615-16 (Ct. App. 1995); See also
People v. Sipe, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 266, 277 (Ct. App. 1995); People v. Price, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d
263, 266 (Ct. App. 1992); People v. Vega, 273 Cal. Rptr. 684, 687 (Ct. App. 1990), disap-
proved on other grounds in People v. McClanahan, 838 P.2d 241, 249 n.6 (Cal. 1992); People
v. Levell, 247 Cal. Rptr. 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1988).
168. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1170.
169. Id.
170. See Tillman, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65.
171. See id.
172. Id (quoting People v. Darwin, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 895 (Ct. App. 1993)).
173. 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894 (Ct. App. 1993).
174. See id. at 895; see also supra Part III.A.l.b., for a discussion of the Bruno decision.
175. See Darwin, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895.
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an offense the prior may not be used for sentence enhancement,
whereas the deleted sentence of section 1170 "did not address the
dual use of a prior as an element of an offense and for sentence en-
hancement .... ",176 Section 1170 "merely addressed sentencing, stat-
ing that a fact could not be used twice to 'determine, aggravate, or
enhance as a sentence,' [therefore,] '[t]hese two points are not the
same.'" 177
Even more recently, the California Court of Appeal for the First
District, Division Two, in People v. Tillman expressly noted its disap-
proval with the earlier cases that found Edwards had been legislatively
overruled. 178 The Tillman court sided with the Darwin case, finding
that case "more persuasive." 179
B. Critique
In People v. Dotson,180 the California Supreme Court stated that an
indeterminate life sentence imposed under Three Strikes was not a
sentence enhancement. 181 The court reasoned the particular subdivi-
sion of Three Strikes in question merely described a "method by
which [a] defendant's minimum indeterminate life term is calcu-
lated."1 82 In so doing, the California Supreme Court may have im-
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See People v. Tillman, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 56, 66 (Ct. App. 1999).
179. Id Without resolving the issue, the California Supreme Court noted the disagree-
ment between the courts of appeal regarding Edwards' viability. See People v. Baird, 906
P.2d 1220, 1221-24 (Cal. 1995).
180. 941 P.2d 56 (Cal. 1995).
181. See id. at 61.
182. Id. The subdivision referred to by the California Supreme Court in Dotson was
subdivision (c) (2) (A) of the initiative version of Three Strikes. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.12 (c) (2) (A) (West Supp. 1999). Section 1170.12 (c) (2) (A) provides:
(c) For purposes of this section, and in addition to any other enhancements or
punishment provisions which may apply, the following shall apply where a de-
fendant has a prior felony conviction:
(2) (A) If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions... the term
for the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term of life imprison-
ment with a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as the
greater of
(i) three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current
felony conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions, or
(ii) twenty-five years or
(iii) the term determined by the court pursuant to section 1170 for the un-
derlying conviction ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (c)(2)(A). The terms are virtually identical to the legislature's
version of the statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (2) (i)-(iii) (West 1999).
Fall 1999]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
pliedly rejected the application of the Edwards rule to Three Strikes.18 3
Although, the court has not specifically decided Edwards' application,
when the issue does arise the court should follow Tillman's cue and
find that Edwards applies to Three Strikes.
Under Edwards, a prior felony conviction cannot be used to both
increase a sentence and prove an element of the charged offense.18 4
The Tillman court was correct in its determination that the past trend
of pigeonholing Three Strikes into an enhancement or an alternate
sentencing scheme box misses the point of Edwards-"a single fact
may not be used both as an element of the current offense and as the
basis for imposition of more severe punishment than would otherwise
be prescribed for that offense. '1 8 5
In Tillman, the court recognized that the Edwards rule could po-
tentially limit the prior convictions used to trigger Three Strikes. 186
Nevertheless, the Tillman court declined to extend the Edwards prohi-
bition against dual use to Three Strikes because "it must be
remembered that the rule in Edwards is one intended to effectuate
legislative intent."'18 7 The plain language of the Three Strikes stat-
ute, 18 the Tillman court reasoned, indicated that the legislature in-
tended harsher punishment for all recidivist felons, "'regardless of
whether a prior conviction is a component of their current felony."' 18 9
183. Notably, if Three Strikes was found to be an enhancement by the California
Supreme Court, then the defendant's sentence in Benson would potentially violate the rule
set forth in People v. Jones, 857 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1993). In Jones, the California Supreme
Court held that the same prior conviction could not be used to enhance a sentence under
California Penal Code section 667.5 (a) and Penal Code section 667 (b). See Jones, 857 P.2d
at 1169. Under Jones, "when multiple statutory enhancement provisions are available for
the same prior offense,. .. [only] the greatest enhancement... will apply." Id. at 1166-67.
In Benson, one enhancement occurred when his petty theft was elevated from a misde-
meanor to a felony based on his prior felony conviction. See People v. Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr.
690, 692 (Ct. App. 1997), superseded by People v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998). If sen-
tencing under Three Strikes equals an enhancement, then his sentencing violates the Jones
rule. Since the court cannot use both enhancements under Jones, the additional punish-
ment under Three Strikes could have been stricken or stayed to comply with the rule.
184. See People v. Edwards, 557 P.2d 995, 999 (Cal. 1976).
185. People v. Tillman, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 56, 68 (Ct. App. 1999).
186. See id. at 69 (stating "despite our disagreement with caselaw finding Edwards either
no longer viable or inapplicable to the Three Strikes situation ..
187. Id
188. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (f)(1) (West 1999) ("[Three Strikes] shall be applied in
every case in which a defendant has a prior [serious or violent] felony conviction .... ")
(emphasis added); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (West 1999) (calculating sentences
under Three Strikes shall apply "in addition to any other enhancement or punishment
provisions which may apply...") (emphasis added).
189. Tillman, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 69 (quoting People v. Sipe, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 266, 278
(Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added).
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The Tillman court concluded the Edwards rule frustrates the legislative
intent behind Three Strikes. 190 The rule's operative effect would disal-
low the dual use of a prior felony conviction, thus decreasing the
number of strikes that could flow from one prior felony conviction.1 91
The Tillman court started its analysis in the right direction by
finding that the Edwards rule applied to Three Strikes. Unfortunately,
the court lost focus and ultimately found Edwards inapplicable in the
Three Strikes context. Applying Edwards does not frustrate the desire
of the legislature and electorate to punish recidivists. First, in the case
of Benson, an application of the Edwards rule still allows for the defend-
ant to be punished for his recidivism by charging him with a felony
instead of a misdemeanor for his petty theft. Second, the plain lan-
guage of Three Strikes indicates that the intent behind the legislation
was to "ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for
those who commit a felony. . ".."192 The phrase "commit a felony" can
reasonably be interpreted to mean the legislature and electorate did
not intend to punish persons who commit misdemeanors. A "felony" is
defined as a "crime of a graver or more serious nature than those
designated misdemeanors.' 9 3 In Benson, the defendant committed a
misdemeanor crime (petty theft), 194 which technically became a fel-
ony when the court charged him with the crime of petty theft with a
prior. 195 By charging and convicting Benson of a felony instead of a
190. See id. In Tillman, the defendant's prior rape conviction was used as an element of
his current offense for failure to register as a sex offender. In addition, his prior rape
conviction was used to enhance his sentencing because it constituted a "strike" under
Three Strikes. See id. at 58. If the trial court had applied the Edwards rule to the facts in
Tillman, then the defendant would not have been sentenced as a second strike offender
(i.e. one for the prior rape conviction and one for the current felony).
191. See id. at 69.
192. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1999) (emphasis added).
193. BLACK'S LAw DIcTioNARY 617 (6th ed. 1990).
194. See People v. Benson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 692 (Ct. App. 1997) superseded by Peo-
ple v. Benson, 954 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1998); see alsoExparteBoatwright, 15 P.2d 755, 757 (Cal.
1932). The California Supreme Court stated:
Petit larceny, or petit theft, is not of itself a felony, and becomes such only when it
is superadded to some other offense of which the party charged has suffered con-
viction, and this is done, not to enlarge the scope of the crime, but to add to the
punishment of the person who commits it, for his many prior violations of the
law.
Id. at 757.
195. See Benson, 954 P.2d at 558. "A defendant who has been convicted of and impris-
oned for enumerated theft-related crimes and who is subsequently convicted of petty theft
'is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail . . . not exceeding one year, or in the
state prison.'" People v. Bouzas, 807 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Cal. 1991) (quoting CAL. PENAL
CODE § 666). The court has the discretion to treat the offense as either a misdemeanor or a
felony. See id.
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misdemeanor, the court already punished Benson for his recidivism
once, in satisfaction of the legislature's intent to have recidivists re-
ceive increased punishment based on their repeated offenses against
society. Thus, Benson's same prior felony conviction should not be
used again to punish him for his recidivism under Three Strikes be-
cause it violates the Edwards rule.
Benson did not raise the Edwards issue on appeal. Had he done
so, the California Supreme Court would have been forced to decide
whether Edwards limits Three Strikes. The rule, if applied in Benson's
case, would have allowed for a dramatically different result in his sen-
tencing. 196 The application of Edwards would have compelled the
court to disallow the dual use of Benson's prior felony convictions-
elevating his current offense (petty theft) from a misdemeanor to a
felony (petty theft with a prior), and using the priors again to increase
his sentence under Three Strikes. Such a decision would have meant
the difference between Benson spending the rest of his life in prison
or receiving a maximum sentence of six years. 19 7
IV. Analysis
A. The Purpose of Recidivist Sentencing Laws and the Need for a
"Brought and Tried Separately" Requirement
The incredibly harsh sentencing under Three Strikes came about
because of public frustration over recidivism. 9 8 Recidivists are per-
sons who continue to commit criminal, antisocial behavior after incar-
ceration for an earlier offense. 199 Recidivist statutes aim at punishing
those who have shown they are incorrigible offenders. 200
196. But see Bouzas, 807 P.2d at 1076. In Bouzas, the California Supreme Court deter-
mined that in the context of a section 666 petty theft with a prior charge, the prior "is a
sentencing factor for the trial court and not an 'element' of the section 666 'offense' that
must be determined by ajury." Id. at 1085. Based on this language, the California Supreme
Court may preclude the Edwards rule from applying to a factual situation like the one in
Benson.
197. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 ( West 1999); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e) (1)
(West 1999).
198. After news of Polly Klaas' murder was reported in December 1993, the growing
public sentiment against repeat offenders such as Richard Allen Davis led to an unprece-
dented collection of over 800,000 signatures for Proposition 184. See Luna, supra note 1, at
5; see also Victor Sze, A Tale of Three Strikes: Slogan Triumphs Over Substance as Our Bumper-
Sticker Mentality Comes Home to Roost, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1047, 1057 (1995).
199. See MENASTER & RCCIARDULLI, supra note 9, at 36.
200. See Rogers, supra note 137, at 153; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1999)
(stating "It is the intent of the Legislature . . . to ensure longer prison sentences and
greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of
serious and/or violent felony offenses.").
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Consistent with the purpose of recidivist statutes, the California
Court of Appeals in People v. Diaz °20 concluded that:
'[I]t has been held in the great majority of cases that two or more
convictions on the same day, or on different counts under the same
indictment, or convictions at the same term of court cannot be
cumulated so as to count as two or more previous convictions within the
meaning of [recidivist] statutes, although, as specifically held in some
cases, one of such convictions may be counted as a prior conviction
within the meaning of the statute.' 20 2
A reading of the Three Strikes law indicates that as a recidivist's
criminal record becomes progressively more extensive, his sentence
should increase accordingly. For instance, if the offender commits a
violent offense, he is prosecuted and punished, incurs "one strike"
and has an opportunity to change his criminal ways. 20 3 If he fails to
take advantage of this opportunity and commits another serious or
violent felony, his sentence will be doubled,20 4 providing him with one
last opportunity to reform his behavior. However, if the offender does
not reform from the second punishment, and commits another seri-
ous or violent felony, he will be sentenced to life in prison. 20 5
The intent behind recidivist statutes such as Three Strikes will
best be served if the defendant is sentenced to life in prison only after
he has been "twice convicted of a [serious or violent felony].... twice
punished for the offenses, and twice fails to reform.... ,2 06 If multiple
convictions from a prior criminal proceeding become strikes, "the
term Three Strikes becomes disingenuous and misleading," thereby
"allowing multiple convictions resulting from a single criminal epi-
sode to substitute for a true history of repeated criminal conduct."20 7
The best way to further the intent of Three Strikes and of recidivist
statutes generally is to do what the Fuhrman court failed to do-incor-
porate the section 667(a) requirement that prior convictions be
brought and tried separately into the Three Strikes law.20 8
201. 53 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Ct. App. 1966).
202. Id. at 668 n.1 (Ct. App. 1966) (emphasis added) (quoting Annotation, Chronologi-
cal or procedural sequence of former convictions as affecting enhancement of penalty for subsequent
offense under habitual criminal statutes, 24 A.L.R. 2d 1247, 1249 (1952)).
203. See MENAsrER & RICCIAaULL I, supra note 9, at 37.
204. See Cal. Penal Code § 667(e)(1) (West 1999).
205. See CAL. PENA. CODE § 667(e) (2) (West 1999).
206. MENASTER & RIcciARntULL, supra note 9, at 38.
207. See Rogers, supra note 137 at 153.
208. See MENASTER & Riccl ARut I, supra note 9, at 36.
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B. Double-Counting and Dual Use of a Prior Felony Conviction
Frustrates the Purpose of a Recidivist Statute
As Fuhrman and Benson illustrate, when California courts double
count a bad act and dually use prior felony convictions, the applica-
tion of Three Strikes will not necessarily correspond to the defend-
ant's misconduct. Benson received a life sentence for stealing a carton
of cigarettes fifteen years after committing his previous offense. He
should have been treated as a two-strike offender, not a three-strike
offender.
Double-counting allows the number of prior felony convictions,
even if from a single prior proceeding, to determine the sentencing-
not the number of bad acts. If each prior felony conviction is counted,
rather than each criminal act, a defendant's punishment under Three
Strikes will turn on arbitrary factors such as the prior prosecutor's
choice of charges, the terms of the plea bargain, whether a prosecutor
elects to plead offenses committed at different times in separate infor-
mations, or whether the defendant is successful in moving forjoinder
of offenses at trial.20 9 All of these arbitrary factors cause defendants
with the same or similar criminal histories to be treated differently.210
For instance, had Fuhrman pled guilty to only one count instead of
two, he fortuitously would not have faced his third strike. Such arbi-
trary factors defeat the purpose of Three Strikes. 211
Without a "brought and tried separately" requirement, Three
Strikes allows for two sets of defendants to be treated differently on
the basis of the timing of their prior felonies.212 For example, if one
defendant sustains two "serious felonies" in a single prior case, a new"serious felony" conviction will support an automatic twenty-five years
to life prison sentence under Three Strikes, plus one five year enhance-
ment under California Penal Code section 667(a). 213 If another de-
fendant sustains two "serious felonies" in two different cases, and
commits a new "serious felony," his sentence would be twenty-five
years to life in prison plus two five year enhancements under Califor-
nia Penal Code section 667 (a). 2 14
Similarly, in the context of dual use, Benson's prior burglary








demeanor to a felony, and twice to count as a strike). Benson's pun-
ishment for his third felony conviction was worse than if his prior
felonies had been two murders. For instance, the felony "petty theft
with a prior" hinges on whether the defendant committed a prior
theft-related offense. 215 If Benson had committed two prior murders,
his third offense, petty theft, would not be ratcheted to a felony because
a murder was not theft-related. In other words, the trial court would
never have sentenced Benson under Three Strikes for the petty theft
offense had his two prior felony convictions been murders. Thus, the
discrepancy in sentencing between a petty thief with two prior, sepa-
rate murders on his record and a petty thief, like Benson, with a prior
theft-related felony conviction on his record, illustrates the distorted
effect caused by dual use and double-counting. Under this hypotheti-
cal, Benson's second bad act against society, although comparable in
seriousness of offense to the murderer's third bad act, results in Ben-
son receiving a much harsher sentence, even though he was not a
three-time offender or a murderer. If a two-time offender can be sen-
tenced as a three-strike offender under a law whose popular slogan
was "Three Strikes and You're Out," then double-counting defeats the
overall message of the Three Strikes law. Similarly, under dual use the
same holds true when a trial court manufactures two strikes from one
prior felony conviction. Such an artificial creation of strikes by the
trial court miscalibrates a defendant's true history of recidivism, turn-
ing Three Strikes into a farcical, overtly harsh measure, reserved not
just for those who truly are the "worst of the worst" offenders, but also
for those less deserving of a life sentence.
Conclusion
Double-counting a bad act and dual use of a prior felony convic-
tion pose serious real-life consequences for criminal defendants who
may be facing a third strike/life sentence when, in reality, they should
only be facing a two strike/double sentence if the acts or strikes been
counted or used correctly. Thus, the purpose of recidivist laws like
215. See CAL. PENAL CODE §666 (West 1999). It provides:
Every person who, having been convicted of petit theft, grand theft, auto theft
under section 10851 of the Vehicle Code, burglary, carjacking, robbery, or a felony
violation of section 496 and having served a term therefore in any penal institu-
tion or having been imprisoned therein as a condition of probation for that of-
fense, is subsequently convicted of petit theft, then the person convicted of that
subsequent offense is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceed-
ing one year, or in the state prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 666.
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Three Strikes are ill-served when dual use and double-counting oc-
curs. The California Supreme Court should prohibit double-counting
by disallowing a single act or indivisible course of conduct from count-
ing as more than one strike. The court should also forbid the dual use
of a prior felony conviction as a means to increase a misdemeanor to a
felony and to count as a strike. By imposing a brought and tried sepa-
rately requirement and applying the Edwards rule, only then can the
public policy purpose behind Three Strikes of increasing penalties for
separate, bad acts be accomplished. This author urges the California
Supreme Court to uphold the Edwards decision, apply it to Three
Strikes cases, and prohibit dual use of prior felony convictions.
